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Abstract
Since the creation of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000, Chinese 
official development assistance (ODA) to Africa has increased drastically. Only few 
analyses on the determinants of Chinese ODA allocation to African countries are 
available. Moreover, existing literature mainly focused on total aid flows while Chinese 
motivations for aid allocation might differ depending on the ODA sector considered. 
Our objective is to study the factors associated with Chinese aid allocation to African 
countries by sector between 2000 and 2014. We consider 3 ODA broad sectors as defined 
by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): the social 
infrastructure and services sector, the economic infrastructure and services sector and 
the production sector. Chinese ODA is measured using the AidData’s Global Chinese 
Official Finance Dataset, 2000-2014, Version 1.0, released in fall 2017. 
… /…
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…/… Over the 2000-2014 period, China allocated 971, 218 and 138 ODA projects to 
African countries in the social infrastructure and services sector, the economic 
infrastructure and services sector and the production sector respectively. Between 2000 
and 2014, the economic infrastructure and services sector was the first sector in terms of 
ODA amount with a total of US$18.9 billion ahead from the social infrastructure and 
services sector with US$7 billion or the production sector with US$3.1 billion. Results of 
our analysis suggest that the motivations of Chinese aid allocation to African countries 
differ by sector. Chinese ODA in the social infrastructure and services sector appears 
responsive to the economic needs of recipient countries but is also driven by foreign 
policy considerations. Chinese economic interest, in particular for natural resources 
acquisition, is associated with China’s ODA allocation in the economic infrastructure and 
services sector. Finally, while institutions in recipient countries are not related to Chinese 
ODA in the social infrastructure and services sector, we find that China allocates more 
ODA in the economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector to 
African countries with weaker institutions. One of the strong conclusions of this study is 
to show that considering only China's overall aid to Africa can be misleading as to its 
underlying determinants, and therefore to point out the need to disaggregate the 
analysis by ODA sectors. 
1. Introduction 
On what preference an esteem is based, 
And that is to estimate nothing but to estimate everyone.  
 
Molière, Le Misanthrope, I,1. 
 
The forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was created in 2000 in Beijing in order to 
strengthen Sino-African economic cooperation and diplomatic relationships. Since 2000, the 
volume of Sino-African trade has tremendously increased from US$9.7 billion in 2000 to a peak of 
US$215.9 billion in 2014 (United Nations Comtrade Database). Most of Chinese imports from 
African countries relate to natural resources with fuels, minerals and metals making up respectively 
38.5, 14.8 and 10.7% of Chinese imports from Africa in 2016 (World Integrated Trade Solution 
database). On the other hand, Chinese exports to African countries are dominated by the 
machinery and electrical sector (26.9% of exports), the textiles and clothing sector (19.1%), the 
metals sector (11.2%) and the transportation sector (7.3%). Over the last 20 years, Chinese Foreign 
Direct Investments (FDI) in Africa has also risen drastically. The global Chinese FDI stock in Africa 
increased from US$0.5 billion in 2003 to US$21.7 billion in 2012 (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development Bilateral FDI Statistics). This stock reached US$34.7 billion in 2015 (2015 
Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign Direct Investment). According to the Africa 
investment report 2016 of FDI Intelligence, the coal, oil and natural gas sector ranked as the top 
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sector for Chinese capital investment in 2015 with US$15.7 billion invested and 24% of the total FDI 
stock. The alternative and renewable energy sector ranked as the second largest sector of Chinese 
FDI with US$12.2 billion invested and 18% of the FDI stock. In terms of type of activity, extraction 
and electricity accounted for almost half (46%) of the Chinese FDI stock in Africa in 2015 with 
US$30.1 billion invested. Moreover, in 2015, infrastructure-related activities (electricity, 
construction and information and communications technology & internet infrastructure) 
accounted for 13% of all Chinese FDI projects in Africa and for 44% of capital invested.  
Since the creation of the FOCAC in 2000, Chinese official development assistance (ODA) to Africa 
has also largely increased. Between 2000 and 2014, African countries have received as much as 
1592 Chinese ODA projects for a total amount of 34.8 billion of 2014US$. In the political sciences 
literature, China is often accused of allocating its ODA in its own interests. China would allocate 
ODA to African countries mainly to guarantee its access to the natural resources of these countries 
and to secure exporting markets for its products. Moreover, Chinese ODA to Africa would also be 
used to extend China’s international support (Naim, 2007, Lin et al., 2016). China refutes these 
accusations and states allocating its ODA in response to the needs expressed by the recipient 
countries, following an equality and mutual benefit principle and according to a non-interference 
principle (Declaration of the Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, 
2006/11/05; Kjøllesdal et al., 2010; Second White Paper on China's Foreign Aid, 2014). 
A recent literature on the determinants of Chinese ODA to African and non-African countries has 
emerged. As in the broader aid allocation literature on traditional donors, this recent literature has 
investigated the role of 3 types of variables that might influence Chinese aid allocation decisions: 
the needs and merits of recipient countries and the economic and political interests of China. 
Dreher and Fuchs (2015) study the determinants of Chinese aid allocation to all recipient countries 
over the 1956-2006 period. The authors use several data sources and focus on total Chinese aid as 
well as food aid and the number of Chinese medical teams sent to recipient countries. Their results 
point to the lack of influence of recipient countries’ oil production for the receipt of total ODA 
projects and food aid but not for the receipt of Chinese medical teams. On the contrary, they show 
that United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) voting alignment of recipient countries with China is 
positively correlated with all types of Chinese aid received except for food aid. Results of Dreher 
and Fuchs (2015) also underline the prominence of political considerations in Chinese aid 
allocation. In a very recent study, Dreher et al. (2018) focus on total amounts of Chinese ODA and 
Other Official Flows (OOF) to African countries over the 2000-2013 period. Their results confirm 
those of Dreher and Fuchs (2015). Indeed, they find that foreign policy considerations, as measured 
by Taiwan recognition, UNGA voting alignment or temporary membership of African countries on 
the United Nations Security Council, are significantly correlated with Chinese ODA amount and 
Chinese grants. On the contrary, they find that Chinese economic interests, as measured by 
recipient countries’ trade with China or oil production, do not impact ODA allocation but only the 
allocation of less concessional flows (OOF). Guillon and Mathonnat (2017) study the factors 
associated with Chinese heath ODA projects and amounts to African countries between 2006 and 
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2013. They find that Chinese health aid is responsive to the economic needs (as measured by the 
Growth Domestic Product - GDP - per capita) of recipient countries while it is unrelated to various 
measures of health needs or governance quality in African countries. They also find no strong 
evidence that Chinese health aid allocation decisions favor natural resources-rich countries or 
countries with important commercial ties with China. As highlighted by Dreher and Fuchs (2015) 
and Dreher et al. (2018) for Chinese ODA in all sectors, results of Guillon and Mathonnat (2017) 
confirm the idea that China uses its health aid as part of its foreign policy since non-adherence to 
the one-China policy makes the receipt of Chinese health aid very unlikely. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) classifies ODA in 3 main 
sectors: 1) the social infrastructure and services sector (thereafter referred to as the social sector) 
which gathers ODA in education, general and reproductive health, water supply and sanitation, 
government and civil society and other social infrastructures; 2) the economic infrastructure and 
services sector (thereafter referred to as the economic sector) which includes ODA in transport and 
storage, communications, energy, banking and business and 3) the production sector that 
comprises ODA in agriculture, forestry and fishing, industry, mining and construction, trade and 
tourism. Existing literature on the determinants of Chinese aid allocation mainly focused on total 
aid flows or on specific types of aid such as food aid, health aid or the sending of medical teams. 
However, Chinese motivations for aid allocation might differ depending on the ODA sector 
considered. Given the explicit economic interests of China in specific areas of African economies 
such as the energy or the transportation sectors, one might hypothesize that economic 
motivations are more important in explaining Chinese aid allocation in the economic and 
production sectors compared to the social sector. On the other hand, motivations behind aid 
allocation to the social sector might be more related to the needs of African countries given the 
lack of direct economic interests of China in this sector. Besides pure altruism, aid allocation in the 
social sector might also be used by China as a soft power to extend its international support and 
visibility. 
Our objective is to study the factors associated with Chinese aid allocation to African countries over 
the 2000-2014 period. In particular, we aim to test whether variables related to the needs and 
merits of African countries and to the political and economic self-interests of China differently 
impact the volume of Chinese aid to African countries depending on the sector considered. 
Compared to the existing literature, this will refine our understanding of the factors influencing the 
allocation of Chinese aid to Africa. Given the lack of Chinese official ODA data, we measure Chinese 
aid allocation to Africa using the last version of the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance 
Dataset, 2000-2014, Version 1.0 (Dreher et al., 2017) released on fall 2017. We consider 3 main 
types of sectors mentioned above as defined by the OECD: the social sector, the economic sector 
and the production sector. We focus on the number of Chinese ODA projects and on ODA amount. 
For ODA amount, the analysis is restricted to the economic broad sector given the very high shares 
of social and production projects that lack financial valorization, 60.7% and 54.3% respectively 
versus only 28.9% for economic projects.  
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Between 2000 and 2014, China allocated 971 ODA projects to African countries in the social sector. 
Over the same period, China financed 218 projects in the economic sector amounting for a total of 
US$18.9 billion and 138 projects in the production. Our results suggest that factors associated with 
Chinese aid allocation depend on the sector considered. ODA in the social sector appears more 
responsive to the needs of African countries while it is also linked to foreign policy considerations. 
Natural resources acquisition is associated with total Chinese ODA allocation and more specifically 
to ODA allocation in the economic sector. Finally, in line with results found by the literature on 
Chinese FDI, China tends to allocate more economic and production ODA to African countries with 
weaker political governance.  
2. Chinese ODA to African countries 
As stated above, we use the last version of the AidData's Global Chinese Official Finance Dataset, 
2000-2014, Version 1.0 (Dreher et al., 2017) to measure Chinese aid allocation to African countries. 
This database was created using the Tracking Under-Reported Financial Flows (TUFF) methodology 
that uses 3 stages: 1) identification of potential projects through extensive searching involving 
official sources and media reports; 2) source triangulation to search for and synthesize additional 
sources for each project identified in the first stage and 3) quality control. The database provides a 
detailed description of each project that includes the source of funding (official/unofficial), the 
donor intent (development, commercial, representational or mixed), the flow type (grants, 
technical assistance, loans, debt relief, export credits, scholarships…), the grant element, the flow 
class (ODA, OOF or vague), the date of the project, the recipient country, the sector of the project 
(Creditor Reporting System code as recorded by OECD), the status of the project (pledged, 
committed, in implementation, completed, suspended or cancelled) and the value of the 
associated funding in 2014US$.  
In this database we selected Chinese ODA to African countries and gathered them in 3 broad 
sectors according to the OECD classification. Regarding the status of the projects, we chose to 
include only completed projects and projects currently under implementation. Committed or 
pledged projects for which the proof of money disbursement is lacking, as well as cancelled and 
suspended projects, were excluded from the analysis. Thus, we focus on Chinese aid 
disbursements, rather than commitments, to African countries.  
A total of 1592 ODA projects were financed by China in Africa between 2000 and 2014 for a total 
amount of 34.8 (2014) US$ billion. Table 1 gives the repartition of Chinese ODA projects and 
amount by sector between 2000 and 2014. When looking at the number of projects, the top 5 
sectors are health (466 projects, 29.2%), government and civil society (202 projects, 12.7%), 
education (192 projects, 12.1%), agriculture, forestry and fishing (104 projects, 6.5%) and transport 
and storage (98 projects, 6.2%). A different picture emerges when focusing on the amount of ODA 
projects. In that case, the top 5 sectors are transport and storage (US$12.4 billion, 35.8%), energy 
generation and supply (US$4.1 billion, 11.8%), action relating to debt (US$3.4 billion, 9.8%), water 
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supply and sanitation (US$2.4 billion, 7%) and communications (US$2.3 billion, 6.8%). Then, sectors 
where costly infrastructure projects are more prevalent rank better when analyzing ODA amount 
rather than ODA projects. This is broadly confirmed by the analysis of the mean amount of ODA 
projects. As for total ODA amounts, the transport and storage, energy generation and supply and 
water supply and sanitation sectors are in the top 5 sectors. Two sectors enter the top 5 when 
considering the mean amount of ODA projects: the industry, mining and construction sector and 
the trade and tourism sector. It should be noted that financial valorization is lacking for an 
important number of ODA projects. Some sectors particularly suffer from this weakness; for 
example the health sector where the amount is missing for 70.2% of ODA projects or the education 
sector where 66.2% of ODA projects lack financial valorization. Other main sectors for which 
financial amounts of ODA projects are widely missing include the government and civil society 
sector, the communication sector, the energy supply and generation sector, the agriculture, 
forestry and fishing sector and the industry, mining and construction sector. 
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Table 1: Chinese ODA to Africa by sector (2000-2014)  
2000-2014 
 Projects Amount (2014US$) % projects with 
missing 
amount 
Mean 
amount† 
(2014US$) 
Sector Total % Rank Total % Rank 
Education  192 12.06 3 468 578 102 1.35 12 66.15 7 208 894 
Health  466 29.27 1 1 033 209 712 2.97 10 70.17 7 433 163 
Population Policies / 
Reproductive Health 
5 0.31 18    20.00  
Water Supply and Sanitation  33 2.07 12 2 421 585 269 6.96 4 33.33 110 072 058 
Government and Civil Society 202 12.69 2 1 356 232 634 3.90 9 46.53 12 557 710 
Other Social infrastructure / 
services 
73 4.59 7 1 744 647 120 5.01 7 32.88 35 605 043 
Transport and Storage 98 6.16 5 12 473 528 239 35.84 1 31.63 186 172 063 
Communications 60 3.77 9 2 353 820 716 6.76 5 41.67 67 252 020 
Energy Generation and 
Supply 
58 3.64 10 4 097 086 723 11.77 2 41.38 120 502 551 
Banking and Financial 
Services 
1 0.06 22    100.00  
Business and Other Services 2 0.13 21 5 569 156 0.02 21 50.00 5 569 156 
Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fishing 
104 6.53 4 219 301 687 0.63 15 58.65 5 100 039 
Industry, Mining, 
Construction 
28 1.76 13 1 883 830 952 5.41 6 60.71 171 257 359 
Trade and Tourism 6 0.38 17 979 674 136 2.82 11 0.00 163 279 023 
General Environmental 
Protection 
5 0.31 19 10 964 468 0.03 20 40.00 3 654 823 
Women 8 0.50 16 11 657 675 0.03 19 62.50 3 885 892 
Other Multisector 45 2.83 11 1 669 084 743 4.80 8 51.11 75 867 488 
General Budget Support 3 0.19 20 49 690 137 0.14 17 0.00 16 563 379 
Developmental food aid 26 1.63 14 62 652 069 0.18 16 46.15 4 475 148 
Non-food commodity 
assistance 
3 0.19 20 3 906 077 0.01 22 66.67 3 906 077 
Action Relating to Debt 62 3.89 8 3 417 068 532 9.82 3 16.13 65 712 856 
Emergency Response 96 6.03 6 249 595 419 0.72 14 32.29 3 839 930 
Administrative Costs of 
Donors 
0 0.00 23 0 0.00 23   
Support to NGOs* and 
Government Organizations 
3 0.19 20 12 596 477 0.04 18 0.00 4 198 826 
Non specified 13 0.82 15 299 157 609 0.80 13 0.00 23 012 124 
Total  1592 100  34 801 465 045 100    
† Per project with financial valorization available 
* Non-governmental Organizations 
We now focus on the 3 broad OECD sectors. Figure 1 shows the repartition of ODA projects and 
amount by broad sectors. Over the 2000-2014 period, the social sector gathered 971 projects (61% 
of all ODA projects) for a total amount of US$7 billion (20.2% of the total ODA amount). The 
economic sector grouped 218 projects (13.8% of total) with a total amount of US$18.9 billion 
(54.4% of total). Finally, the production sector is the smallest broad sector as it included only 138 
projects (8.7% of total) for a total amount of US$3.1 billion (8.9% of total). As mentioned above, the 
main caveat of analyzing Chinese ODA amount is the existence of missing values for the financial 
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valorization of ODA projects. This is particularly problematic in the social sector where 557 ODA 
projects over 971 (60.7%) lack financial valorization and in the production sector where the 
financial amount is missing for 75 ODA projects over 138 (54.3%). In the economic sector, only 63 
ODA projects over 218 (28.9%) lack financial valorization. It follows that smaller ODA amounts 
observed in the social and production sectors are partly attributable to the higher shares of 
projects lacking financial valorization in these 2 sectors.  
Figure 1: Repartition of Chinese ODA projects and amount by sector 
 
Figure 2 and Table 1 show the evolution of Chinese ODA projects and amount to African countries 
by broad sector between 2000 and 2014.  
The number of projects in the economic and production sectors remained relatively stable over 
time. On the contrary, the number of ODA projects in the social sector increased over time, 
particularly between 2006 and 2009 when the number of social ODA projects reached 118 (12.2% 
of the total). Over the study period, ODA amounts appear more volatile than the number of ODA 
projects, especially in the economic sector. In 2006, the amount of economic ODA increased a first 
time to reach US$1.8 billion while it was only of US$761 million in 2005. The amount of economic 
ODA then decreased steadily between 2006 and 2010. A new increase in economic ODA amount is 
observed between 2010 and 2012 when the amount of economic ODA reached its peak at US$3.5 
billion (18.5% of the total). The amount of economic ODA then decreased sharply in 2013. Beyond 
the global trends it is therefore important to consider the instability of Chinese ODA whether it's 
the number of projects or the amount. Coefficients of variation (standard deviation/average) show 
that instability is much stronger for economic and production projects than for total aid and for 
social sector support.  
61%14%
9%
16%
Repartiton of ODA projects by sector
Social sector Economic sector
Production sector Other sectors
20%
54%
9%
17%
Repartiton of ODA amount by sector
Social sector Economic sector
Production sector Other sectors
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Figure 2: Evolution of ODA projects and amount by year and type of project 
 
If we look at the Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration index, we can also note that Chinese aid to 
Africa is not very concentrated for the number of projects in the 3 sectors, but that it is notably 
more for the amount, and quite strongly for production sector (see Table A1 in Appendix A). 
Table 3 displays the top 5 recipient countries for ODA projects and amount between 2000 and 
2014. Four countries received no ODA project in either broad sector over the study period: Burkina 
Faso, Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland. When considering the 3 broad sectors 
together, 23 countries benefited from 1 to 20 projects and 10 from 21 to 74 projects. Over the 
study period, Tanzania is the country that received the highest number of all broad sectors projects 
with a total of 74 projects (5.6% of total ODA projects in the 3 broad sectors) including 53 projects 
in the social sector (5.5% of all social ODA projects) where it also ranks as the top recipient, 14 
projects in the economic sector (6.4% of all economic ODA projects) where it ranks third and 7 
projects (5.1% of all production ODA projects) in the production sector where it ranks fifth. The 
second highest recipient country is Zimbabwe with a total of 71 projects (5.4% of total) in the 3 
broad sectors. Zimbabwe ranks as the top recipient country for production projects (with 11 
projects, 8% of total), as the second highest recipient for social projects (with 47 projects, 4.8% of 
total) and as the fifth recipient for economic projects (with 13 projects, 6% of total). Uganda is the 
third highest recipient country with a total of 59 projects (4.4% of total). Uganda is also in the top 5 
recipient countries for social and production projects with respectively 44 (4.5% of total) and 7 
projects (5.1% of total). Liberia and Ghana complete the top 5 of recipient countries with 55 (4.1% 
of total) and 53 (4% of total) projects respectively in all 3 broad sectors. Liberia is also in the top 5 
for social and production projects (41 and 10 projects, 4.2% and 7.2% of total) while Ghana is in the 
top 5 for social and economic projects (39 and 13 projects, 4% and 6% of total). 
The country that received the highest amount of Chinese ODA in the 3 broad sectors between 
2000 and 2014 is Tanzania, which is also the top recipient for the number of projects, with a total of 
almost US$3 billion (10.2% of the total ODA amount in the 3 broad sectors). Being ranked in the top 
5 for ODA projects does not guarantee a country to be in the top 5 for ODA amount. Indeed, 
Tanzania and Zimbabwe are the only countries in the top 5 for both ODA projects and amount in 
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the 3 broad sectors. Three countries not previously listed in the top 5 of ODA projects appear in the 
top 5 for ODA amount in the 3 broad sectors: Cameroon, Nigeria and Ethiopia. Ranking 
modifications between ODA projects and amount might be explained by 2 factors; the larger size 
of ODA projects received by some countries or the higher prevalence of missing ODA amounts for 
other countries. If we only look at the economic sector, for which missing amounts of ODA projects 
are less frequent, we still find a difference in the ranking for ODA projects and amount. This 
indicates that Cote d'Ivoire, Eritrea, Zambia and the Republic of Congo, which rank in the top 5 for 
economic ODA amount but not for ODA projects, tended to benefit from larger economic ODA 
projects between 2000 and 2014.  
Table 2: Evolution of ODA projects and amount by year and type of project 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
SD*/
mean 
Total 
projects 
36 34 44 66 77 59 115 117 114 154 93 123 109 89 97 0.40 
Social 
projects 
27 23 33 49 44 38 78 89 81 118 77 90 73 71 80 0.42 
Economic 
projects 
6 7 6 10 28 12 20 15 12 14 10 22 29 13 14 0.50 
Production 
projects 
3 4 5 7 5 9 17 13 21 22 6 11 7 5 3 0.69 
Total 
amount 
(2014 US$ 
million) 
586 246 952 385 590 861 2480 1716 1548 3234 1645 3890 6130 2507 2262 0.82 
Social 
amount  
(2014 US$ 
million) 
271 89 225 205 205 86 414 490 270 1785 808 424 1309 291 153 1.03 
Economic 
amount 
(2014 US$ 
million) 
258 93 713 145 384 761 1789 1095 1252 1349 838 3315 3508 1316 2109 0.83 
Production 
amount 
(2014 US$ 
million) 
57 64 14 35 0 14 278 131 26 100 0 151 1312 900 0 1.86 
* Standard deviation 
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Table 3: Top 5 recipient countries by broad sector 
ODA projects 
Country Total % Country 
Social 
sector 
% Country 
Economic 
sector 
% Country 
Productio
n sector 
% 
Tanzania 74 5.6 Tanzania 53 5.5 Kenya 17 7.8 Zimbabwe 11 8 
Zimbabwe 71 5.4 Zimbabwe 47 4.8 Zambia 15 6.9 Liberia 10 7.2 
Uganda 59 4.4 Uganda 44 4.5 Tanzania 14 6.4 Niger 8 5.8 
Liberia 55 4.1 Liberia 41 4.2 Ghana 13 6 Kenya 7 5.1 
Ghana 53 4 Ghana 39 4 Zimbabwe 13 6 
Sierra 
Leone. 
Tanzania. 
Uganda 
7 5.1 
ODA amount (2014 US$ billion) 
Country Total % Country 
Social 
sector 
% Country 
Economic 
sector 
% Country 
Productio
n sector 
% 
Tanzania 2.97 10.2 Cameroon 1.25 17.8 Nigeria 2.01 10.6 Tanzania 1.31 42.3 
Cameroon 2.88 9.9 Zimbabwe 1.06 15.1 Ethiopia 1.84 9.7 
Cote 
d'Ivoire 
1.02 33.1 
Nigeria 2.04 7 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
0.48 6.8 Cameroon 1.57 8.3 Eritrea 0.30 9.6 
Ethiopia 2.00 6.9 Kenya 0.37 5.3 Mozambique 1.50 7.9 Zambia 0.08 2.5 
Zimbabwe 1.79 6.2 Uganda 0.34 4.8 Tanzania 1.43 7.6 Congo. Rep. 0.06 2 
 
3. Methods 
Following the literature on aid allocation (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Dollar and Levine, 2006; 
Berthélemy, 2006; Nunnenkamp and Öhler, 2011) we consider 3 types of variables that might 
influence Chinese aid allocation: the needs and merits of African countries and the political and 
economic self-interests of China. To measure the needs of African countries we use the GDP per 
capita and the ratio of the total debt service1 to Growth National Income (GNI). In robustness 
analysis, we use the Human Development Index (HDI) instead of the GDP per capita as an 
alternative measure of African countries’ needs. To measure merits of recipient countries we use 
the control of corruption index of Kaufmann et al. (2011). This index is rated on a scale from -2.5 to 
2.5 where a score of 2.5 represents the highest level of corruption control. In robustness analysis we 
test for the impact of another measure of corruption: the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI, 
Transparency International). As alternative measures of merits, we also use 2 other Worldwide 
Governance Indicators, namely the regulatory quality and rule of law indexes (Kaufmann et al., 
2011). We distinguish between economic and political interests of China. To measure Chinese 
economic interests we use 2 variables: the natural resources rent in African countries and their 
openness rate to China, both being measured as percentages of GDP. Political interests of China 
are taken into account by the use of 2 variables: the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
                                                            
1 Total debt service is the sum of principal repayments and interest actually paid in currency, goods, or services on long-
term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and repayments (repurchases and charges) to the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF). 
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voting alignment of African countries with China (Strezhnev and Voeten, 2013) and a binary 
variable which is equal to 1 if the country has official diplomatic relations with Taiwan (Rich, 2009). 
As a control variable we also insert a binary variable equal to 1 if English is an official language in 
the recipient country. In order to test whether Chinese ODA is a complement or a substitute to 
ODA of traditional donors, we also insert ODA commitments of Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) countries (OECD data) as an explanatory variable. Table B1 in Appendix B 
provides the definitions and data sources of all explanatory variables.  
We study the number of ODA projects and the amount of ODA allocated by China to the different 
African countries. We stratify the analysis by broad ODA sectors and distinguish between ODA in 
the social, economic and production sectors. As financial valorization is lacking for more than half 
of social (60.7%) and production (54.3%) ODA projects, we restrict the analysis of ODA amount to 
the economic sector. To derive the value of Chinese ODA in the economic broad sector we first 
calculate ODA amounts by country-year for each of the 5 individual sectors included in the broad 
economic sector (transport and storage, communications, energy generation and supply, banking 
and financial services and business and other services). For each individual sector, the amount of 
Chinese ODA is equal to 0 if a country received no Chinese ODA project in a given year while it is 
coded as missing if financial valorization lacks for all projects received by a country in this sector a 
given year. If data on the financial amount is available for at least one project in the individual 
sector, the amount of ODA is calculated as the sum of every monetary values available for projects 
received by the country in a given year in this sector. After calculating ODA amounts in individual 
sectors, we derive the amount of economic ODA by summing the individual sectors’ ODA amounts. 
For each country-year observation, the amount of economic ODA is equal to 0 if ODA amounts are 
null in all individual sectors. The amount of Chinese ODA in the economic broad sector is coded as 
missing if ODA amounts are lacking for all individual sectors. Otherwise, the value of Chinese 
economic ODA is calculated as the sum of all non-missing individual sectors’ amounts. The overall 
correlation between economic ODA projects and amount is equal to 0.52 and is significant at the 
1% level2. 
An important proportion of countries received no Chinese ODA project or amount each year. This 
leads to an overrepresentation of 0 values in our data. Thus, simple OLS regressions cannot be used 
as they would result in coefficients biased toward 0. This would ultimately lead to an 
underestimation of the impact of needs, merits and interests variables on Chinese ODA allocation. 
The overrepresentation of zeros in data is often dealt with specific econometric models such as 
two-part models or Heckman selection models. However, the use of such models would assume 
that China proceeds sequentially in its aid allocation decisions by first choosing the recipient 
countries and then deciding on the volume of ODA to allocate to these countries. This assumption 
appears unrealistic as the literature has shown the lack of centralization and coordination in 
Chinese aid policy which involves multiple actors at the national and regional levels (Grépin et al., 
                                                            
2 Corresponding correlations are much lower for the social and production sectors, 0.2577 and 0.1992 respectively, due to 
a high share of missing values for the amount of ODA projects in these sectors. 
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2014; Lin et al., 2016). Instead, we decide to use maximum likelihood Poisson regressions to study 
both Chinese ODA projects and amount. Silva and Tenreyro (2006 and 2011) have demonstrated 
that Poisson models perform well in the presence of heteroskedasticity and many zero 
observations. Moreover, the use of Poisson regressions has become common in the trade literature 
to estimate gravity models (Shepherd, 2010; Fernandes et al., 2016; Anderson and Yotov, 2016) and 
Poisson regressions have recently been used to estimate the factors associated with DAC countries 
aid allocation (Acht et al., 2015). A body of the aid allocation literature also uses Tobit models to 
estimate factors associated with aid allocation (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; Nunnenkamp and 
Öhler, 2011). The Tobit model allows estimating the factors associated with the volume of aid while 
correcting for the downward bias introduced by the many 0 observations. In Tobit models, the 
estimation is done in one step such that independent variables are assumed to have similar 
impacts on the probability of receiving aid and on the volume of aid allocated among recipient 
countries. The main drawback of the Tobit model is the homoscedasticity condition it imposes on 
residuals. Because of this this limitation, we only use it to test the robustness of our results. 
A part of the aid literature chooses to use aid shares of recipient countries in the total aid of the 
donor country, rather than absolute amounts of aid, as dependent variables (Neumayer, 2003. Clist, 
2011; Acht et al., 2015). To test the robustness of results based on absolute volumes of Chinese aid, 
we also run regressions using the shares of Chinese aid received using fractional probit models. 
The share ODA projects received by a country in a given year is equal to the number of ODA 
projects received by this country this year divided by the total annual number of Chinese ODA 
projects to African countries. Similarly, the share of economic ODA amount received by a country in 
a given year is equal to the amount of economic ODA received by the country this year divided by 
the annual total amount of Chinese economic ODA to African countries. 
To retain intra-country heterogeneity for the identification of factors associated with Chinese aid 
allocation we chose to use pooled regressions rather than fixed effect regressions. Indeed, fixed 
effect regressions wipe out intra-country heterogeneity over time and mainly rely on inter-country 
heterogeneity for the estimation of regressions coefficients. In our analysis, the use of fixed effect 
regressions would be problematic given the low variability over time and within country of some 
independent variables such as Taiwan recognition or the governance quality indicators. We include 
year fixed effects in all regression analyses and compute robust standard errors clustered at the 
country level. Following a common pattern in the aid allocation literature, we lag independent 
variables by one year (except ODA amount from DAC countries and the dummy variable for English 
speaking countries) in order to limit reverse causation concerns (Berthélemy and Tichit, 2004; 
Younas, 2008; Stubbs et al., 2016).  
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4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4 provides the descriptive statistics of dependent variables for the sample used in regression 
analyses. Descriptive statistics for independent variable can be found in Table C1 in Appendix C. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for the sample used in regression analyses 
Variable Obs. Mean / % Std. Dev. Min Max 
Total ODA projects 578 1.925606 2.031725 0 11 
Social ODA projects 578 1.385813 1.53015 0 7 
Economic ODA projects 578 0.330449 0.691473 0 4 
Economic ODA amount (2014 US$ million) 578 29.94396 111.8945 0 919.7054 
Production ODA projects 578 0.209342 0.50931 0 3 
In average, African countries received 1.93 Chinese ODA projects per year in all 3 broad sectors 
between 2000 and 2014. The maximum number of Chinese ODA projects received by an African 
country over a given year is 11 for Uganda in 2014. Over the 2000-2014 period, the mean annual 
number of social projects is 1.39 with a maximum of 7 for Uganda in 2009 and 2017, Sudan in 2009, 
Niger in 2010, Liberia in 2011 and Ghana in 2009. For economic and production projects, the mean 
number of projects received by African countries each year is much lower and equal to 0.33 and 
0.21 respectively. The maximum numbers of economic and production projects received in a given 
year are 4 and 3 respectively. In average, African countries received US$29.9 million of economic 
ODA each year over the 2000-2014 period. The maximum economic ODA amount received over a 
given year is equal to US$919.7 million for Nigeria in 2006. 
4.2. Results of regression analyses using ODA projects and amount 
Table 5 displays the results of the main analysis using Poisson regressions. Results are expressed as 
incidence rate ratios (IRR) in order to quantify the impact of the independent variables on the 
dependent variables. A coefficient higher than 1 (lower than 1) indicates a positive (negative) 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables.  
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Table 5: Factors associated with Chinese ODA projects and amount 
Total 
projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita 0.950** 0.945*** 0.974 0.938 0.943 
  (0.0194) (0.0189) (0.0326) (0.0609) (0.0348) 
Debt to GNI ratio 0.995*** 0.993*** 0.999 1.000 0.999 
  (0.00181) (0.00209) (0.00367) (0.0142) (0.00240) 
Population 0.993*** 0.994*** 0.994** 1.002 0.993** 
  (0.00113) (0.00128) (0.00265) (0.00350) (0.00283) 
Control of corruption index 0.798** 0.938 0.570*** 0.775 0.455*** 
  (0.0819) (0.110) (0.0933) (0.319) (0.103) 
Natural resources rent 1.010*** 1.010*** 1.016*** 1.041*** 0.998 
  (0.00276) (0.00338) (0.00600) (0.0127) (0.00963) 
Openness rate 1.002 1.005* 0.985*** 0.892** 1.009 
  (0.00210) (0.00256) (0.00425) (0.0480) (0.00540) 
UNGA voting alignement 1.004** 1.004* 1.007 0.992 1.001 
  (0.00189) (0.00219) (0.00454) (0.00976) (0.00499) 
Taiwan recognition 0.0336*** 0.0355*** 0.0505*** 0.0775** 9.04e-08*** 
  (0.0251) (0.0257) (0.0478) (0.0798) (4.33e-08) 
English-speaking country 2.532*** 2.148*** 5.235*** 4.422** 2.722*** 
  (0.252) (0.230) (1.038) (2.563) (0.763) 
Total ODA DAC countries 1.000** 
  (0.000140)         
Social ODA DAC countries 1.000 
    (0.000176)       
Economic ODA DAC  1.001*** 1.002*** 
countries (0.000456) (0.000715) 
Production ODA DAC          1.002 
countries         (0.00116) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 581 578 578 581 
Incidence rate ratios ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Needs. Lower levels of GDP per capita and debt service ratio are associated with higher levels of 
Chinese aid, as a whole and for the social sector. Regarding the needs variables, the GDP per 
capita in African countries is negatively correlated with the total number of Chinese ODA projects 
when considering the 3 broad sectors together. A US$1000 increase in GDP per capita is associated 
with a 5% decrease in the number of ODA projects received by African countries. When 
decomposing the analysis by sector, we find that the GDP per capita is significantly associated with 
the number of social projects but not with the number of economic or production projects nor the 
amount of economic ODA. A US$1000 increase in GDP per capita is associated with a 5.5% 
decrease in the number of Chinese social ODA projects received by African countries. When using 
the HDI as an alternative measure of needs, we again find a negative correlation between needs of 
African countries and the total number of projects in the 3 broad sectors as well as the number of 
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social projects. This alternative measure of needs is also negatively correlated with the number of 
ODA projects in the production sector (see Table D1 in Appendix D). As for the GDP per capita, the 
debt to GNI ratio is negatively associated with the total number of projects in the 3 broad sectors 
and the number of social ODA projects but not with the number of projects or the amount of ODA 
in the economic and production sectors. The correlations between the debt ratio and the total 
number of projects or the number of social projects are negative. There are however of low 
magnitude as a one percentage point increase in debt to GNI ratio is associated with only 0.5 and 
0.7% decreases in the total number of projects and the number of social projects respectively. 
Similar to results obtained for traditional donors in the aid allocation literature, the size of the 
population is negatively correlated with the number of Chinese ODA projects, whatever the sector. 
Merits. Lower control of corruption is associated with more aid, globally and for the economic 
and production sectors. Turning to merits variables, we find a negative correlation between the 
control of corruption index in African countries and the total number of Chinese ODA in the 3 
broad sectors. African countries with higher levels of corruption received a higher number of all-
sectors Chinese ODA projects between 2000 and 2014. When disaggregating the analysis by sector, 
we find that this overall association is driven by the economic and production sectors. Indeed, 
while there is no significant association between corruption and the number of social projects, the 
analysis highlights negative and significant correlations between the control of corruption index 
and the number of economic and production projects. For the economic sector, the association 
between corruption and the volume of Chinese ODA only holds for the number of projects. These 
results are confirmed for an alternative measure of corruption, the corruption perceptions index 
(see Table D2 in Appendix D). When using alternative measures of governance, we find a negative 
correlation between the regulatory quality index and the number of projects in the economic 
sector and a negative correlation between the rule of law index and the number of Chinese ODA 
projects in the production sector (see Table D3 and D4 in Appendix D).  
Chinese economic interests. A high endowment in natural resources is a good context for 
benefiting from more Chinese ODA. On the contrary, foreign policy divergences with China have 
globally the opposite effect. Regarding Chinese economic interests, regression analyses point to a 
positive correlation between the natural resources rent in African countries and the total number 
of Chinese ODA projects. If we disaggregate the analysis by sector, we see that this association is 
only significant for the social and economic sectors. Moreover, the association is of higher 
magnitude for the economic sector compared to the social sector as a one percentage point 
increase in the natural resources rent is associated with a 1% increase in the number of social 
projects and a 1.6% increase in the number of economic projects. For the economic sector, results 
also show a positive correlation between the natural resources rent and the amount of ODA. A one 
percentage point increase in the natural resources rent is associated with a 4.1% increase in 
Chinese economic ODA amount. The openness rate of African countries to China is not significantly 
correlated with the number of ODA projects received in the 3 broad sectors. This lack of 
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significance is explained by the existence of opposite correlations between the openness rate to 
China and the number of Chinese ODA projects depending on the sector considered. Results 
indicate a positive, marginally significant and low correlation between the openness rate to China 
and the number of social ODA projects while they point to a negative and much stronger 
correlation between this variable and the number of economic projects. This negative association 
is confirmed when looking at economic ODA amount instead of projects. We find no significant 
correlation between the openness rate to China and the receipt of production projects.  
Taiwan recognition by an African country almost systematically excludes it from the receipt of 
Chinese ODA, whatever the sector. Indeed, we find negative and very strong correlations between 
Taiwan recognition and Chinese ODA in all broad sectors. For the second Chinese political 
interests’ variable, results show a positive correlation between the total number of ODA projects 
and UNGA voting alignment of African countries with China. A sectorial analysis indicates that 
social ODA projects are associated with this variable but not ODA in the economic or production 
sectors. The magnitude of these correlations are however low as a one percentage point increase 
in UNGA voting alignment with China is only associated with a 0.4% increases in social ODA 
projects and all-sectors ODA projects.  
Regarding the relation between Chinese and DAC donors ODA, our results show that Chinese aid 
and DAC ODA commitments are positively correlated in the economic sector but not in the social 
or production sectors. 
Robustness of results. Table 6 displays the results of the alternative regression analysis using Tobit 
specifications. These specifications broadly confirm our results. Results for needs and merits 
variables as well as for the natural resources rent are identical to those obtained using Poisson 
regressions. For the openness rate to China, we again find a positive correlation between this 
variable and the number of social projects and negative correlations with economic ODA projects 
and amount. However, using Tobit regressions, results now indicate a positive correlation between 
the openness rate to China and the number of Chinese ODA production projects. For the political 
interests’ variables, we still find negative and very strong correlations between Taiwan recognition 
and the all types of Chinese ODA3. However, differences emerge with the Poisson specifications for 
the UNGA voting alignment with China variable. While we previously found that UNGA voting 
alignment with China was positively correlated with total ODA projects and ODA projects in the 
social sector, results now only point to a positive correlation between this variable and the number 
of ODA projects in the economic sector.  
  
                                                            
3 The Taiwan recognition variable was omitted in the estimation of the Tobit model production ODA projects given 
convergence issues. 
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Table 6: Tobit specifications for factors associated with Chinese ODA volume 
Total projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita -0.119*** -0.105*** -0.0411 -7500447.0 -0.0430 
  (0.0423) (0.0356) (0.0370) (7867367.9) (0.0347) 
Debt to GNI ratio -0.0166** -0.0184*** -0.00359 -2895784.0 0.00466 
  (0.00712) (0.00553) (0.00500) (1893543.6) (0.00391) 
Population -0.0204*** -0.0125*** -0.00989** -374988.0 -0.00659* 
  (0.00344) (0.00266) (0.00389) (777915.3) (0.00366) 
Control of corruption index -0.664** -0.188 -0.644*** -52987371.6 -1.091*** 
  (0.301) (0.255) (0.229) (42443913.0) (0.296) 
Natural resources rent 0.0240*** 0.0176** 0.0228*** 4197742.7*** 0.804 
  (0.00737) (0.00745) (0.00634) (1360616.9) (0.0127) 
Openness rate 0.0200** 0.0277*** -0.0182*** -5215305.1*** 0.0121* 
  (0.00961) (0.00771) (0.00540) (1297907.8) (0.00722) 
UNGA voting alignement 0.00712 0.00600 0.0105** 569851.7 0.00966 
  (0.00513) (0.00442) (0.00532) (1370450.7) (0.00722) 
Taiwan recognition -6.075*** -4.649*** -2.942*** -419845214.8*** 
  (0.729) (0.619) (0.740) (139420934.9)   
English-speaking country 2.456*** 1.571*** 2.052*** 280468538.2*** 1.083*** 
  (0.310) (0.254) (0.270) (51784032.4) (0.288) 
Total ODA DAC countries 0.000867* 
  (0.000470)         
Social ODA DAC countries 0.000564 
    (0.000515)       
Economic ODA DAC  0.00144* 252832.8 
countries (0.000833) (159058.0) 
Production ODA DAC          0.00213 
countries         (0.00145) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 581 578 578 581 
Standard errors in parentheses ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
4.3. Results of regressions analyses using aid shares 
Results are confirmed by analyses based on aid shares (number of projects and amounts). Results of 
regression analyses using aid shares are very similar to those obtained using absolute volumes of 
Chinese ODA. For needs variables we again find negative correlations between the GDP per capita 
in African countries and the number of Chinese ODA projects in the 3 broad sectors as well as the 
number of social ODA projects. Contrary to the previous analysis, we now also find a negative 
correlation between the share of production projects and the GDP per capita. For the debt to GNI 
ratio results are identical to the previous analysis. The debt ratio is negatively correlated with the 
share of total projects in the 3 broad sectors and the share of social projects. Results using aid 
shares again point to a negative association between the size of the population and Chinese aid 
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allocation. The population size is negatively correlated with the shares of Chinese ODA projects 
received globally and in the 3 individual sectors.  
Table 7: Factors associated with Chinese ODA shares 
Share of Chinese ODA 
Total 
projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita -0.0210** -0.0227*** -0.00910 -0.0231 -0.0257* 
  (0.00830) (0.00820) (0.0136) (0.0199) (0.0140) 
Debt to GNI ratio -0.00218** -0.00292*** -0.000477 -0.00928 -0.00109 
  (0.000953) (0.00111) (0.00139) (0.00854) (0.00193) 
Population -0.00325*** -0.00313*** -0.00374** -0.000714 -0.00214 
  (0.000563) (0.000548) (0.00162) (0.00155) (0.00161) 
Control of corruption index -0.131*** -0.0765 -0.265*** 0.0231 -0.416*** 
  (0.0453) (0.0513) (0.0906) (0.147) (0.126) 
Natural resources rent 0.00444*** 0.00444*** 0.00651** 0.0158*** 0.000217 
  (0.00108) (0.00129) (0.00256) (0.00379) (0.00550) 
Openness rate 0.000747 0.00219* -0.00845*** -0.0300** 0.00322 
  (0.000977) (0.00113) (0.00199) (0.0152) (0.00305) 
UNGA voting alignement 0.00220** 0.00232** 0.00452** 0.00232 0.00217 
  (0.000870) (0.000948) (0.00189) (0.00344) (0.00249) 
Taiwan recognition -1.221*** -1.179*** -1.019*** -0.977*** -3.744*** 
  (0.189) (0.189) (0.300) (0.306) (0.130) 
English-speaking country 0.430*** 0.352*** 0.752*** 0.720*** 0.446*** 
  (0.0457) (0.0480) (0.0905) (0.154) (0.130) 
Total ODA DAC countries 0.000130*         
  (0.0000674)         
Social ODA DAC countries   0.000139       
    (0.0000877)       
Economic ODA DAC countries     0.000784*** 0.000998***   
    (0.000256) (0.000373)   
Production ODA DAC countries         0.000760 
          (0.000906) 
Constant -2.503*** -2.456*** -2.916*** -2.768*** -2.636*** 
  (0.0931) (0.0980) (0.205) (0.360) (0.278) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 581 578 578 581 
Standard errors in parentheses ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Regarding the merits variable, our results indicate that the control of corruption index is negatively 
correlated with the shares of economic and production projects as well as the share of projects in 
the 3 sectors. These results are similar to those obtained using the number of aid projects.  
For Chinese economic interests’ variables, results are perfectly similar to those obtained when 
studying the absolute volume if Chinese aid. The natural resources rent is positively correlated with 
the share of all-sectors projects, with the shares of social and economic projects and with the share 
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of economic ODA amount. As in the previous analysis, the openness rate to China is positively 
correlated with the share of social projects but negatively correlated with the shares of economic 
projects and amount.  
Similar to what was found in the analysis using aid volumes, Taiwan recognition is negatively and 
very strongly correlated with the shares of Chinese ODA projects in all individual sectors and the 
share of economic ODA. Once again, results indicate a positive correlation between UNGA voting 
alignment with China and the share of social projects as well as the share of all-sectors ODA 
projects. UNGA voting alignment of African countries with China is now also positively correlated 
with the share of economic projects received while this variable was not previously significantly 
correlated with the number of economic projects.  
When using the shares of Chinese ODA instead of absolute aid volumes, we again find a positive 
correlation between economic ODA commitments of DAC countries and Chinese economic ODA. 
5. Discussion 
This paper provides a sectorial analyses of the determinants of Chinese aid allocation in African 
countries. We consider 3 types of ODA sectors; the social infrastructure and services sector, the 
economic infrastructure and services sector and the production sector. We study the differentiated 
impacts of African countries needs and merits as well as Chinese interests on aid allocation 
decisions of China in these 3 broad sectors. Our results show the need of disaggregating the 
analysis by sector when studying the determinants of Chinese ODA in Africa. Indeed, any analysis 
considering all-sectors ODA might lead to misleading results as we find that needs, merits and 
interest variables exert different influences on Chinese aid allocation decisions depending on the 
sector considered. Our main results are summarized thereafter. 
First, GDP per capita matters for getting Chinese ODA in the social sector, but not in other 
sectors. Our results show that needs of African countries, as measured by the GDP per capita, 
influence the allocation of Chinese ODA in the social sector but not in the economic or production 
sectors. Dreher and Fuchs (2015) find total Chinese ODA projects and amount are negatively 
correlated with the GDP per capita of recipient countries over the 1996-2006 period while Dreher 
et al. (2018) find that GDP per capita in African countries is negatively correlated with the total 
amount of all-sectors ODA they received from China between 2000 and 2013. Our results also 
indicate a negative association between GDP per capita in African countries and the receipt of all-
sectors Chinese ODA projects. In addition, our results show that this overall association is driven by 
projects received in the social sector and that this pattern is not confirmed for the economic and 
production sectors. This is coherent with results of Guillon and Mathonnat (2017) who find a 
negative correlation between the GDP per capita of African countries and the number health ODA 
projects they received from China over the 2006-2013 period.  
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Second, Chinese ODA to the economic and production sectors is rather moving towards 
countries with weak quality of governance, but this is not the case for social sector. We find that 
the quality of governance in African countries; as measured by several governance variables 
related to corruption, regulatory quality or rule of law; is negatively correlated with Chinese aid 
allocation in the economic and production sectors but unrelated with Chinese ODA in the social 
sector. This second result indicates that African countries with weaker political governance tend to 
benefit more from Chinese ODA in the economic and production sectors. It is in line with results 
found in the literature studying the determinants of Chinese FDI. For example, Buckley et al. (2007) 
find that Chinese FDI over the 1984-2001 period is associated with lower levels of political stability 
in recipient countries. Sanfilippo (2010) investigates the determinants of Chinese FDI in African 
countries between 1998 and 2007 and also finds that Chinese FDIs are more important in African 
countries with lower civil liberties. In several papers, Kolstad and Wiig (2011, 2012) show that 
Chinese FDIs are attracted to African countries with a combination of large natural resources and 
poor institutions as measured by the rule of law index. Then, Chinese ODA allocation decisions 
tend to follow the same motivations as FDI allocation decisions in the economic and production 
sectors. Previous studies on the determinants of Chinese ODA have found that governance in 
recipient countries neither influences the global volume of Chinese ODA in terms of projects 
number or amount (Dreher and Fuchs, 2015; Dreher et al. 2018) nor Chinese health aid projects 
number or amount (Guillon and Mathonnat, 2017). We also find no significant association between 
our governance variables and the total number of Chinese ODA projects in African countries. 
However, our results confirm the global pattern for the social sector but reject it for the economic 
and production sectors. Thus, our results allow for a better understanding of the association 
between political governance in recipient countries and Chinese ODA. 
Third, our results indicate that African countries with high endowments of natural resources 
tend to receive more Chinese ODA when considering the 3 broad sectors all together. This finding 
contradicts those of Dreher and Fuchs (20154) and Dreher et al. (2018) who find no association 
between oil endowment of recipient countries and Chinese ODA5. Our results indicate that the 
association between the natural resources rent and the volume of Chinese ODA holds in the social 
and economic sectors but not in the production sector. Our result regarding the positive 
correlation between the natural resources rent and the number of social ODA projects is in line 
with those of Guillon and Mathonnat (2017) who find that China allocated slightly more health aid 
projects to African countries with a high endowment of natural resources between 2006 and 2013. 
  
                                                            
4 Based on the previous version of the database. 
5 Differences in results might partly be owing to the fact that we use the number of ODA projects, rather than ODA 
amount as in Dreher and Fuchs (2015) and Dreher et al. (2018), given the high number of social and production sectors’ 
ODA projects lacking financial valorization. Moreover, we do not consider all ODA projects as in Dreher and Fuchs (2015) 
and Dreher et al. (2018) but only projects related to the social, economic and production sectors that constitute 84% of all 
Chinese ODA projects to African countries between 2000 and 2014. 
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Our results also point to a positive association between the openness rate to China and the 
overall number of all broad sectors Chinese ODA projects received by African countries. This is in 
line with the findings of Dreher and Fuchs (2015) who find, over the 1996-2006 period, a positive 
correlation between China’s total exports to a recipient country and the number of Chinese ODA 
projects it received. However, it contradicts results of Dreher et al. (2018) who find no association 
between the volume of trade with China and the total amount of ODA received by African 
countries6. If a sectorial analysis of Chinese ODA allocation decisions is not conducted, global 
results might be misleading for the impact of economic ties with China on the receipt of Chinese 
ODA. Indeed, we find that the openness rate to China is positively correlated with the number of 
social projects but uncorrelated with the number of production projects. On the other hand, the 
openness rate to China is negatively correlated with the number and amount of Chinese ODA 
projects in the economic sector. Economic motivations behind Chinese aid then seem to differ 
depending on the sector considered. Our results tend to indicate that aid in the social sector, as 
shown for health aid (Guillon and Mathonnat, 2017), is used as a reward for the opening of 
domestic markets in African countries. On the contrary, countries which trade less with China tend 
to received more Chinese economic ODA, especially in the energy generation and supply sector 
that mainly gathers infrastructure projects relating to power plants construction or rehabilitation7. 
Then, Chinese economic ODA in Africa does not appear conditional on economic ties of African 
countries with China.  
Fourth, as observed in all previous studies of Chinese ODA determinants, our results indicate 
that adherence to the One-China policy is a necessary condition to benefit from Chinese ODA. 
This is true for all aid sectors and whether studying the number of ODA projects or ODA amount. 
UNGA voting alignment with China is positively correlated with the number of ODA projects 
received when considering the 3 broad sectors together. This result differs from those obtained by 
Dreher and Fuchs (2015) who find no association between UNGA voting alignment with China and 
all-sectors Chinese ODA amount and projects received over the 1996-2006 period. It also differs 
from findings of Dreher et al. (2018) who show that the total amount of Chinese ODA received by 
African countries between 2000 and 2012 is independent of their UNGA voting alignment with 
China. A possible explanation for these conflicting results could rely on the fact that ODA projects 
are more reactive than ODA amount to UNGA voting patterns of African countries. Indeed, projects 
relating to technical assistance such as trainings, scholarships or the sending of Chinese experts, 
whose financial valorization is more often lacking, are more easily cancelled than costly 
infrastructure projects in cases of political disagreements between China and an African country. 
Again, our analysis stresses out the need to disaggregate the analysis by ODA sectors when 
studying the factors associated with Chinese ODA. Indeed, UNGA voting alignment of African 
countries with China appears to be associated with the number of social ODA projects (which more 
                                                            
6 Idem.  
7 When looking at Chinese ODA by individual sectors, we find that the negative correlation between the openness to 
China and the receipt of economic projects is mainly driven by the energy supply and generation sector (results not 
shown). 
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often correspond to technical assistance projects in the form of training, scholarships or sending of 
Chinese experts) and, to a lesser extent, to the number of economic ODA projects. However, it 
appears unrelated to the amount of economic ODA or the number of production projects received. 
Overall, it appears that Chinese ODA allocation decisions rely on different motivations 
depending on the sector considered. While Chinese ODA in the social sector is more responsive to 
the economic needs of recipient countries, it also appears to be driven by foreign policy 
considerations. We find some evidence that Chinese economic interests, in particular for natural 
resources acquisition, are associated with China’s ODA allocation in general and more specifically 
in the economic sector. Finally, while governance quality in recipient countries is unassociated with 
ODA in the social sector, our results show that China tend to allocate more economic and 
production ODA to African countries with weaker institutions similar to what is observed for its FDI 
allocation.  
Our work is not without limitations. Chinese ODA data used in the analysis are less complete than 
those available for OECD countries or international organizations. In particular, the financial 
valorization of ODA is lacking for a high number of projects. This led us to restrict the analysis of 
ODA amount to the economic sector where the financial valorization of ODA projects is less often 
missing. However, Chinese official ODA data are very sparse due to a large fragmentation of 
funding agencies (China Ministry of Commerce, Export-Import Bank of China, China Development 
Bank and various provincial agencies among others) and possibly owing to a will of Chinese 
authorities to retain specific information on overseas development activities. Despite the 
limitations of the data we use, we believe our results bring new and important information on the 
underlying motivations of Chinese aid allocation in the absence of comprehensive official ODA 
data, one strong conclusion of this study being, as we have pointed out, the need to disaggregate 
the analysis by ODA sectors.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ferdi WP n°225  Guillon, M, and Mathonnat, J. >> What can we learn on Chinese aid allocation motivations … 23 
References 
 Acht, M., Mahmoud, T. O., & Thiele, R. 
(2015). Corrupt governments do not 
receive more state-to-state aid: 
Governance and the delivery of foreign 
aid through non-state actors. Journal of 
Development Economics, 114, 20-33. 
 Anderson, J. E., & Yotov, Y. V. (2016). Terms 
of trade and global efficiency effects of 
free trade agreements, 1990–2002. Journal 
of International Economics, 99, 279-298. 
 Berthélemy, J. C., & Tichit, A. (2004). 
Bilateral donors' aid allocation decisions—
a three-dimensional panel analysis. 
International Review of Economics & 
Finance, 13(3), 253-274. 
 Berthélemy, J. C. (2006). Bilateral donors’ 
interest vs. recipients’ development 
motives in aid allocation: do all donors 
behave the same?. Review of Development 
Economics, 10(2), 179-194. 
 Buckley, P. J., Clegg, L. J., Cross, A. R., Liu, 
X., Voss, H., & Zheng, P. (2007). The 
determinants of Chinese outward foreign 
direct investment. Journal of international 
business studies, 38(4), 499-518. 
 Clist, P. (2011). 25 years of aid allocation 
practice: Whither selectivity?. World 
Development, 39(10), 1724-1734. 
 Dollar, D., & Levin, V. (2006). The 
increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–
2003. World development, 34(12), 2034-
2046. 
 Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015). Rogue aid? 
An empirical analysis of China's aid 
allocation. Canadian Journal of 
Economics/Revue canadienne 
d'économique, 48(3), 988-1023. 
 Dreher, Axel, Andreas Fuchs, Bradley 
Parks, Austin M. Strange, and Michael J. 
Tierney. (2017). Aid, China, and Growth: 
Evidence from a New Global Development 
Finance Dataset. AidData Working Paper 
#46. Williamsburg, VA: AidData. 
 Dreher, Axel et al. (2018) Apples and 
Dragon Fruits: The Determinants of Aid 
and Other Forms of State Financing from 
China to Africa. International Studies 
Quarterly, doi:10.1093/isq/sqx052 
 Fernandes, A. M., Freund, C., & Pierola, M. 
D. (2016). Exporter behavior, country size 
and stage of development: Evidence from 
the exporter dynamics database. Journal 
of Development Economics, 119, 121-137. 
 Grépin, K. A., Fan, V. Y., Shen, G. C., & Chen, 
L. (2014). China’s role as a global health 
donor in Africa: what can we learn from 
studying under reported resource flows?. 
Globalization and Health, 10(1), 1. 
 Guillon M., Mathonnat J. (2017) “Is there a 
strategy in China’s health official 
development assistance to African 
countries?”, Études et Documents, n° 20, 
CERDI. 
 Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A., & Mastruzzi, M. 
(2011). The worldwide governance 
indicators: methodology and analytical 
issues. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 
3(02), 220-246. 
 Kjøllesdal, K., & Welle-Strand, A. (2010). 
Foreign aid strategies: China taking over?. 
Asian Social Science, 6(10), 3. 
 Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2011). Better the 
devil you know? Chinese foreign direct 
investment in Africa. Journal of African 
Business, 12(1), 31-50. 
 Kolstad, I., & Wiig, A. (2012). What 
determines Chinese outward FDI?. Journal 
of World Business, 47(1), 26-34. 
 Lin, S., Gao, L., Reyes, M., Cheng, F., 
Kaufman, J., & El-Sadr, W. M. (2016). 
China’s health assistance to Africa: 
opportunism or altruism?. Globalization 
and Health, 12(1), 83. 
 Marshall M and Jaggers K (2016) Polity IV 
Project: Political regime characteristics 
and transitions, 1800–2016, dataset users’ 
manual. 
Ferdi WP n°225  Guillon, M, and Mathonnat, J. >> What can we learn on Chinese aid allocation motivations … 24 
 Naim, M. (2007). Rogue aid. Foreign policy, 
(159), 96. 
 Neumayer, E. (2003). What factors 
determine the allocation of aid by Arab 
countries and multilateral agencies?. 
Journal of Development Studies, 39(4), 134-
147. 
 Nunnenkamp, P., & Öhler, H. (2011). Aid 
allocation through various official and 
private channels: Need, merit, and self-
interest as motives of German donors. 
World Development, 39(3), 308-323. 
 Rich, T. S. (2009). Status for sale: Taiwan 
and the competition for diplomatic 
recognition. Issues & Studies, 45(4), 159-
188. 
 Sanfilippo, M. (2010). Chinese FDI to 
Africa: what is the nexus with foreign 
economic cooperation?. African 
Development Review, 22(s1), 599-614. 
 Shepherd, B. (2010). Geographical 
diversification of developing country 
exports. World development, 38(9), 1217-
1228. 
 Silva, J. S., & Tenreyro, S. (2006). The log of 
gravity. The Review of Economics and 
statistics, 88(4), 641-658. 
 Silva, J. S., & Tenreyro, S. (2011). Further 
simulation evidence on the performance 
of the Poisson pseudo-maximum 
likelihood estimator. Economics Letters, 
112(2), 220-222. 
 Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, A. (2013). United 
Nations General Assembly voting data. 
2013. URL http://hdl. handle. 
net/1902.1/12379. 
 Stubbs, T. H., Kentikelenis, A. E., & King, L. 
P. (2016). Catalyzing aid? The IMF and 
donor behavior in aid allocation. World 
Development, 78, 511-528. 
 Younas, J. (2008). Motivation for bilateral 
aid allocation: Altruism or trade benefits. 
European Journal of Political Economy, 
24(3), 661-674. 
 
 
 
 
  
Ferdi WP n°225  Guillon, M, and Mathonnat, J. >> What can we learn on Chinese aid allocation motivations … 25 
Appendix A: Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes for projects and amount 
by sector 
Table A1: Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes for projects and amount 
Herfindahl-Hirschman concentration indexes 
Social sector Economic sector Production sector 
Projects Amount Projects Amount Projects Amount 
0.0321 0.1617 0.0749 0.1277 0.0722 0.4767 
 
Appendix B: Description of variables used in the regression analyses 
Table B1: Definition and source of variables used in regression analyses 
Variable name  Definition  Source 
Total projects Number of Chinese ODA projects in the social, economic 
and production sectors 
AidData's Dataset  
Social projects Number of Chinese ODA projects in the social sector AidData's Dataset  
Economic projects Number of Chinese ODA projects in the economic sector AidData's Dataset  
Economic amount Amount of Chinese ODA in the economic sector (2014 
US$) 
AidData's Dataset  
Production 
projects 
Number of Chinese ODA projects in the production 
sector 
AidData's Dataset  
GDP per capita GDP per capita in thousand (2011 US$), lag World Bank data 
Debt to GNI ratio Total debt service (sum of principal repayments and 
interest actually paid in currency, goods, or services on 
long-term debt, interest paid on short-term debt, and 
repayments to the IMF) in % of GNI, lag 
World Bank data 
Population Population in million, lag World Bank data 
Control of 
corruption index 
Index representing the control of corruption ranging 
from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values corresponding to 
better governance, lag 
World Bank data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 
2011) ; https://data.worldbank.org/ 
Natural resources 
rent 
The total natural resources rent, is the sum of oil, natural 
gas, coal (hard and soft), mineral and forest rents, 
expressed in % of GDP, lag 
World Bank data ; 
https://data.worldbank.org/ 
Openness rate Exports of China to recipient countries plus exports of 
recipient countries to China, expressed as % of African 
countries’ GDP, lag 
World Integrated Trade Solution ; 
https://wits.worldbank.org/ 
UNGA voting 
alignment 
Voting alignment in the United Nations General 
Assembly with China in all vote, expressed in %, lag 
Strezhnev and Voeten (2013) 
Taiwan 
recognition 
Equal to 1 if the country has diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan and 0 otherwise, lag 
Rich (2009), own calculation 
English-speaking 
country 
Equal to 1 if English is an official language in the country 
and 0 otherwise 
Own calculation 
Total ODA DAC 
countries 
ODA commitments of DAC countries in the social, 
economic and production sectors, 2015 US$ million  
OECD ; http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/data/detailed
-aid-statistics_dev-aid-stat-data-en 
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Social ODA DAC 
countries 
ODA commitments of DAC countries in the social sector, 
2015 US$ million  
OECD ; http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/data/detailed
-aid-statistics_dev-aid-stat-data-en 
Economic ODA 
DAC countries 
ODA commitments of DAC countries in the economic 
sector, 2015 US$ million  
OECD ; http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/data/detailed
-aid-statistics_dev-aid-stat-data-en 
Production ODA 
DAC countries 
ODA commitments of DAC countries in the production 
sector, 2015 US$ million  
OECD ; http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/development/data/detailed
-aid-statistics_dev-aid-stat-data-en 
HDI Human development Index, lag World Bank data ; 
https://data.worldbank.org/ 
Corruption 
perceptions Index 
The corruption perceptions index ranks countries based 
on how corrupt a country’s public sector is perceived to 
be. It ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (very 
clean), lag 
Transparency International ; 
https://www.transparency.org/research
/cpi/overview 
Rule of law Index The regulatory quality index rates the ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies 
and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development. It is measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 
where the score of 2.5 represents the best political 
governance, lag 
World Bank data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 
2011) ; https://data.worldbank.org/ 
Voice and 
accountability 
Index 
The rule of law index measures the extent to which 
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of 
society. It is measured on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5 where 
the score of 2.5 represents the best political governance, 
rights, the police, and the courts), lag 
World Bank data from the Worldwide 
Governance Indicators (Kaufmann et al., 
2011) ; https://data.worldbank.org/ 
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Appendix C: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Table C1: Descriptive statistics of independent variables 
Variable Obs. Mean / % Std. Dev. Min Max 
GDP per capita (2011 US$) 578 3779.709 4113.115 492.607 18171.9 
Debt to GNI ratio 578 3.013914 7.814267 .06151 135.376 
Population (million) 578 20.32137 27.452 0.13716 172.8165 
Control of corruption index 578 -0.593172 0.541979 -1.56607 1.24967 
Natural resources rent (% of GDP) 578 15.54244 15.30094 .001854 77.0545 
Openness rate (% of GDP) 578 2.024906 6.249 .0048387 83.77744 
UNGA voting alignment (%) 578 72.80586 19.25451 0 95.89041 
Taiwan recognition      
Yes (%)  9.69    
No (%)  90.31    
English as official language      
Yes (%)  43.77    
No (%)  56.23    
Total ODA commitments DAC 
countries (2015 US$ million) 
578 315.3663 360.2944 3.67707 2923.09 
Social ODA commitments DAC 
countries (2015 US$ million) 
578 221.3089 252.5458 2.315479 2628.62 
Economic ODA commitments DAC 
countries (2015 US$ million) 
578 58.33875 123.1154 .005865 1003.1 
Production ODA commitments DAC 
countries (2015 US$ million) 
578 35.71864 56.13234 .019719 539.7914 
Mean GDP per capita of African countries between 1999 and 2013 was US$3780 (2011 US$) with a 
high heterogeneity as the standard deviation is equal to US$4113, the minimum to US$493 and the 
maximum to US$18,172. In average, the total debt service represented 3% of African countries’ GNI. 
Again, we see a large variability in debt to GNI ratios as, over a given year, the least indebted 
country had a debt to GNI ratio of 0.06% and the most indebted country a debt to GNI ratio of 
135%. Mean population in the sample is 27.452 million with a minimum of 0.14 million and a 
maximum of 172.82 million. Almost half of African countries (43.8%) have adopted English as one 
of their official languages. 
The mean value of the control of corruption index is -0.59, which indicates a high level of 
corruption among African countries in our sample over the 1999-2013 period. In average, the 
natural resources rent was equal to 15.5% among African countries between 1999 and 2013. The 
maximum value of the natural resources rent (77.1%) is reached by the Republic of Congo in 2007. 
The mean openness rate to China is only 2% but with large variations across the sample. Among 
the sample used in regression analyses, the highest openness rate to China (83.8%) is exhibited by 
Liberia in 2012. UNGA voting alignment of African countries with China is high and equal to 71.5% 
on average. In Africa, few countries chose to recognize Taiwan between 1999 and 2013 (only 9.7% 
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of country-year observations). ODA commitments of DAC countries to African countries in the 3 
broad sectors averaged US$315.4 (2015 US$) million over the 1999-2013 period. Mean ODA 
commitments of DAC countries were higher in the social sectors (US$221.3 million) than in the 
economic sector (US$58.34 million) or the production sector (US$35.7 million). 
Appendix D: Results of regression analysis using alternative measures of needs and 
merits 
Table D1: Regression analyses using the HDI as an alternative measure of needs 
Total 
projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
HDI 0.192** 0.198** 0.817 0.259 0.0309*** 
  (0.125) (0.133) (1.009) (0.701) (0.0413) 
Debt to GNI ratio 0.994*** 0.992*** 0.998 0.996 0.999 
  (0.00197) (0.00244) (0.00371) (0.0146) (0.00237) 
Population 0.992*** 0.993*** 0.994** 1.001 0.994** 
  (0.00128) (0.00144) (0.00263) (0.00319) (0.00285) 
Control of corruption index 0.781** 0.894 0.535*** 0.706 0.515*** 
  (0.0819) (0.111) (0.0822) (0.302) (0.102) 
Natural resources rent 1.011*** 1.010** 1.016*** 1.040*** 1.000 
  (0.00366) (0.00445) (0.00618) (0.0123) (0.00931) 
Openness rate 1.002 1.005* 0.986*** 0.906** 1.007 
  (0.00230) (0.00276) (0.00454) (0.0429) (0.00540) 
UNGA voting alignement 1.004** 1.004* 1.007 0.992 1.003 
  (0.00200) (0.00231) (0.00434) (0.0102) (0.00487) 
Taiwan recognition 
0.0332*** 0.0350*** 0.0496*** 0.0721** 
0.000000122
*** 
  (0.0248) (0.0255) (0.0473) (0.0755) (5.75e-08) 
English-speaking country 2.666*** 2.246*** 5.591*** 4.939*** 2.981*** 
  (0.262) (0.245) (1.132) (2.685) (0.729) 
Total ODA DAC countries 1.000***         
  (0.000133)         
Social ODA DAC countries   1.000**       
    (0.000171)       
Economic ODA DAC countries     1.001*** 1.002***   
    (0.000458) (0.000772)   
Production ODA DAC countries         1.002** 
          (0.00118) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 566 569 566 566 569 
Incidence rate ratios ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table D2: Regression analyses using the CPI as an alternative measure of merits 
 Total 
projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita 0.942*** 0.932*** 0.973 0.960 0.967 
  (0.0209) (0.0195) (0.0390) (0.0656) (0.0410) 
Debt to GNI ratio 0.994*** 0.993*** 0.997 0.998 0.997 
  (0.00181) (0.00212) (0.00390) (0.0141) (0.00241) 
Population 0.993*** 0.994*** 0.995* 1.001 0.994** 
  (0.00121) (0.00136) (0.00273) (0.00354) (0.00297) 
Corruption perceptions index 0.995 1.007 0.974** 0.963 0.947*** 
  (0.00598) (0.00649) (0.0121) (0.0249) (0.0175) 
Natural resources rent 1.013*** 1.013*** 1.019*** 1.043*** 0.999 
  (0.00290) (0.00354) (0.00652) (0.0144) (0.00954) 
Openness rate 1.001 1.003 0.988*** 0.894* 1.011* 
  (0.00212) (0.00248) (0.00439) (0.0527) (0.00592) 
UNGA voting alignement 1.003 1.003 1.004 0.994 1.006 
  (0.00208) (0.00234) (0.00476) (0.0101) (0.00611) 
Taiwan recognition 0.0291*** 0.0266*** 0.0591*** 0.0875** 0.000000451*** 
  (0.0262) (0.0242) (0.0553) (0.0881) (0.000000232) 
English-speaking country 2.516*** 2.151*** 5.213*** 5.252*** 2.614*** 
  (0.274) (0.251) (1.100) (3.249) (0.692) 
Total ODA DAC countries 1.000**         
  (0.000137)         
Social ODA DAC countries   1.000       
    (0.000168)       
Economic ODA DAC countries     1.001*** 1.002***   
    (0.000454) (0.000728)   
Production ODA DAC countries         1.001 
          (0.00135) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 523 524 523 523 524 
Incidence rate ratios ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table D3: Regression analyses using the regulatory quality index as an alternative measure of merits 
Total 
projects 
Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita 0.938*** 0.939*** 0.952 0.925 0.890*** 
  (0.0193) (0.0183) (0.0335) (0.0519) (0.0323) 
Debt to GNI ratio 0.995** 0.993*** 1.000 1.001 0.998 
  (0.00202) (0.00222) (0.00381) (0.0140) (0.00272) 
Population 0.994*** 0.994*** 0.996 1.003 0.996 
  (0.00109) (0.00131) (0.00250) (0.00303) (0.00322) 
Regulatory quality index 0.958 1.024 0.768** 0.981 0.997 
  (0.0855) (0.0937) (0.0914) (0.275) (0.227) 
Natural resources rent 1.013*** 1.011*** 1.020*** 1.044*** 1.007 
  (0.00264) (0.00294) (0.00593) (0.0128) (0.00956) 
Openness rate 1.001 1.004* 0.985*** 0.890** 1.005 
  (0.00191) (0.00238) (0.00388) (0.0500) (0.00488) 
UNGA voting alignement 1.004* 1.004* 1.006 0.992 1.000 
  (0.00203) (0.00231) (0.00450) (0.0102) (0.00490) 
Taiwan recognition 0.0342*** 0.0354*** 0.0540*** 0.0783** 0.000000438*** 
  (0.0255) (0.0256) (0.0516) (0.0807) (0.000000203) 
English-speaking country 2.434*** 2.133*** 4.746*** 4.166*** 2.462*** 
  (0.247) (0.229) (0.892) (2.179) (0.703) 
Total ODA DAC countries 1.000**         
  (0.000135)         
Social ODA DAC    1.000       
countries   (0.000176)       
Economic ODA DAC      1.002*** 1.002***   
countries     (0.000470) (0.000721)   
Production ODA DAC          1.001 
countries         (0.00146) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 581 578 578 581 
Incidence rate ratios ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table D4: Regression analyses using the rule of law index as an alternative measure of merits 
 Total projects Social 
projects 
Economic 
projects 
Economic 
amount 
Production 
projects 
GDP per capita 0.939*** 0.934*** 0.948 0.919 0.931* 
  (0.0211) (0.0201) (0.0338) (0.0590) (0.0406) 
Debt to GNI ratio 0.995*** 0.993*** 0.999 1.002 0.998 
  (0.00176) (0.00200) (0.00380) (0.0139) (0.00234) 
Population 0.994*** 0.994*** 0.995* 1.003 0.995* 
  (0.00124) (0.00145) (0.00251) (0.00360) (0.00305) 
Rule of law index 0.949 1.092 0.840 1.070 0.621** 
  (0.115) (0.150) (0.148) (0.429) (0.135) 
Natural resources rent 1.012*** 1.012*** 1.020*** 1.045*** 1.001 
  (0.00272) (0.00322) (0.00609) (0.0120) (0.00903) 
Openness rate 1.001 1.004* 0.983*** 0.888** 1.006 
  (0.00219) (0.00256) (0.00431) (0.0485) (0.00513) 
UNGA voting alignement 1.004* 1.004 1.008 0.992 1.001 
  (0.00223) (0.00259) (0.00471) (0.0100) (0.00456) 
Taiwan recognition 0.0342*** 0.0351*** 0.0531*** 0.0776** 0.000000469*** 
  (0.0256) (0.0253) (0.0511) (0.0803) (0.000000213) 
English-speaking country 2.464*** 2.105*** 4.939*** 4.084** 2.580*** 
  (0.263) (0.239) (0.963) (2.364) (0.739) 
Total ODA DAC countries 1.000**         
  (0.000135)         
Social ODA DAC countries   1.000       
    (0.000167)       
Economic ODA DAC      1.001*** 1.002***   
countries     (0.000475) (0.000705)   
Production ODA DAC          1.002* 
countries         (0.00119) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 578 581 578 578 581 
Incidence rate ratios ; * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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